deliberation of their own ;—and, therefore, ^*e not masters of that wisdom, according to which they act, but only passive to the instincts and impresses thereof upon them. And indeed to affirm, that brute animals do all these things by a knowledge of their, own, and which themselves are masters of, and that without deliberation and consultation, were to make them to be endued with a most perfect intellect, far transcending that of human reason; whereas it is plain enough, that brutes are not above consultation, but below it, and that these instincts of nature in them are nothing but a kind of fate upon them.

15. There is, in the next place, another imperfection to be observed in the plastic nature, that as it doth not comprehend the reason oiits owa action, so neither is it clearly and expressly conscious of what it doth ; in which respect, it doth not only fall short of human art, but even of that very manner of acting, which is in brutes themselves, who, though they do not understand the reason of those actions, that their natural instincts fe^d them to, yet they are generally conceived to be conscious of them, and to do them by fe^cyi; whereas, the plastic nature in the formation of plants and animals seems to have no animal fancy, no express <nW(70wic, con-sense, or consciousness of what it doth. Thus the often commended philo-sopher I *ri* ^>v<nc ovSe *<j>avTa<riav* £)(£«-, *n $* voijcrtc ^avra-*ffictg* Jcpcirrwv, *(ftavracria* §£ /ticra^y ^vo-twc TVTTOV :-, •' . . *Kai* vo?J(T£ft>c" *'H p*v ye* ovfovoc avrtXrj^iv bvSe s. 13. life. ii. *avvtffiv eyu.* Nature hath not so much as ^in^.[1] any fancy in it; as intellection and know- p*407t ledge is a thing superior to fancy, so fancy is su-» perior to the impress of nature, for nature hath na